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What’s the problem 
¤  Globalized (too-big-to-fail) institutions -GSIFIs 
¤  Highly interconnected 
¤  Operating the group as a single business although many parts 
of the business will be separately incorporated and subject to 
the principle of separate legal personality  
¤  Labyrinthine corporate structures 
¤  Local laws have local reach 
¤  Who bears the cost? 
¤  there is no global treaty or a global burden sharing 
arrangement 
Why A Special Resolution Regime? 
¤  General insolvency law unable to deal with bank resolution: 
insolvency law aims at the fair treatment and maximization of 
creditor recovery 
¤  General insolvency law entails lengthy negotiations 
¤  bank resolution aims at minimization of disruption to the 
financial system and continuity of operations  
¤  It minimizes the influence of private parties’ rights (creditros; 
shareholders) 
¤  And reduces the scope for judicial recourse  
¤  Provision of liquidity is of essence 
¤  Resolution options limited as a speedy breaking up or business 
sale might not do  
Two (and a half) 
approaches to Group Resolution 
 
Legal Issues of Cross-border Bank Resolution in the EU Context :  





minimise the costs incurred by their national taxpayers. This is best illustrated by the Fortis experience in 
which the Dutch authorities sought to ring-fence its assets at the last moment. Schoenmaker and 
Goodhart (2006) therefore suggest a backward-solving approach starting at resolution, with the guiding 
principle that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’, in which if the home authority pumps in the most for 
the SRR, then, the resolution should all follow the insolvency jurisdiction in that country. As we will see in 
turn, this backward-solving approach has already been practiced in reality as demonstrated by the more 
cooperative and coordinated solutions that were reached by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg 
authorities in the case of Dexia.  
The Options of Resolution Approaches 
Territoriality Cooperative Territorial approach / 
Modified Universality (‘Middle approach’) 
Universality 
Each national jurisdiction 
applies its own law which 
governs insolvency 
proceedings for the 
entities, operations, and 
assets of the insolvent firm 
located in that jurisdiction. 
 
This protects national 
sovereignty and authority, 
but is normally done so at 
the expense of its cross-
border banking partners. 
 
Recognises the strong possibility of ring 
fencing in a crisis and helps ensure that 
home and host countries and financial 
institutions focus on resiliency within 
national borders. (where they can try to 
align their toolbox vis-à-vis improving their 
legal systems) 
Such an approach may require certain 
discrete changes to national laws and 
resolution frameworks to create a more 
complementary legal framework that 
facilitates financial stability and continuity of 
key financial functions across borders. This 
approach aims at improving, inter alia, the 
ability of different national authorities to 
facilitate continuity in critical cross-border 
operations. 
Resolutions of insolvencies 
based on the law of a single 
country where the home 
entity is established45. Under 
this option, the decisions of 
the resolution authority in 
the home country 
jurisdiction is extended to 
branches, other operations 
and assets of the insolvent 
firms in other jurisdictions. 
Source of information: BCBS Report, March 2010 
In practice, with the exception of rare cases, the resolution of cross-border institutions is pragmatic and is 
not based exclusively on either of the universality or territoriality principles46. The CBRG recommends 
taking the ‘middle ground’ approach for now to head-start greater cross-border cooperation, which may 
lay the foundation for greater understanding47. A possible example of this middle ground approach in the 
                                                          
45  the ability of the home resolution authority to apply and enforce its decisions in other jurisdictions is subject to recognition in foreign 
jurisdictions and the law and policy in those jurisdictions  
46 CBRG Reports and Recommendations, p. 23, BCBS, March 2010 
47 Ibid. 
Obstacles to Cross-border Group 
Resolution 
 
¤  In the absence of an International Treaty all approaches raise 
issues of: 
¤  (at the least) Minimum harmonization of National Resolution rules  
¤  Coordination – Establishment of Coordination Procedures 
¤  Leadership? 
¤   Communication 
¤  Building Institutional Capacity to Implement an International 
Solution 
¤  The Funding of cross-Border Resolution. 
Why fragmentation of global banking 
matters? 
¤  Ring-fencing is the only ‘bullet proof’ solution under the 
circumstances but it harms cross-border banking  
¤  BUT 
¤  Retrenchment into national borders (ring-fencing measures and 
substantial cutbacks in cross border activities) carry high 
economic costs and risks,  
¤  It strains the relations between home and host authorities, 
especially in countries like emerging Europe, where foreign 
banks typically dominate local banking systems.  
¤  Also it destroys group synergies and economies of scale 
FSB’s Key Attributes 
¤  Constitute  ‘soft’ harmonization attempt 
¤  They seem to be widely heeded  
¤  They supply a concrete framework for (national) Special 
Resolution Regimes which provides for: 
¤  Establishment or specification of the competent Resolution 
authority  
¤  Establishment of Clearly Defined Resolution powers  
¤  Set-off, netting, collateralisation, segregation of client assets  
¤  Specified Mechanism for Funding of firms in resolution  
¤  Safeguards  
FSB Key Attributes  
Cross-border co-operation 
¤ Legal framework conditions for cross-border 
cooperation – necessitating MoUs between national 
resolution authorities 
¤ Crisis Management Groups (CMGs)  
¤  Institution-specific cross-border cooperation 
agreements  
¤ Resolvability assessments  
¤ Recovery and resolution planning  
¤ Access to information and information sharing.  
The Role of Recovery  
and Resolution Plans 
¤  Drawing up of Recovery and Resolution Plans (so-called Living 
Wills) and their approval for systemic banks by both home and 
host authorities is an important tool in cross-border supervision 
and resolution of banks. 
¤  They provide an ex ante map of corporate structures and asset 
and liabilities’ distribution around the group as well as early 
indication where the most risky operations of the group are 
located and a description of those risks which is not entirely 
static, as RRPs have to be regularly  updated. 
¤  But there are conflicts of interest, where for instance a parent 
bank and home supervisor may have incentives not to show or 
set up the recovery plans together with the host supervisors. 
¤  RRPs gain in credibility if they are discussed and approved by all 
countries where the relevant bank plays a systemic role, and 
admittedly this problem will probably not arise at least in MoUs 
between developed country regulators .  
BUT 
¤  Too much hinges on trust in terms of resolution authority 
cooperation and MoU effectiveness 
¤  In the absence of legally binding bilateral/multilateral burden 
sharing arrangements the effectiveness of MoUs will be severely 
tested under conditions of crisis  
¤  Cross-border spillovers from regulatory/supervisory actions. In 
crisis situations, capital or liquidity or both are usually in short 
supply – or thought to be  
¤   Host countries may feel the need to restrict the operations of 
bank subsidiaries under their jurisdiction, particularly if these 
subsidiaries are of systemic importance. 
¤  There needs to be agreement ex ante about the practical tools 
in crisis management, such as limiting dividend payments, 
requiring more capital (locally or by parent), raising liquidity 
requirements etc. and certainty that such agreement will be 
adhered to.  
Resolution Techniques for Cross-border 
Groups 
¤  Contemporary resolution strategies for cross-border group 
under development are broadly based around two ‘stylised’ 
approaches, Single Point of Entry (SPE) and Multiple Points of 
Entry (MPE). 
¤  Under an SPE strategy, resolution tools are applied to the non-
viable bank’s holding company or parent entity. As a result, 
losses would be absorbed and the Group recapitalised 
without interfering with the operations of the Group’s 
subsidiaries.  
¤  Namely, In SPE, losses in subsidiaries are transferred to the 
parent company. If this becomes insolvent, it is bailed inThis 
requires that an appropriate quantity of bail-in-able liabilities 
are issued at the parent holding company level. Such an 
approach is significantly simplified if the parent holding 
company does not book or otherwise contain any of the 
Group’s operational assets. 
MPE 
¤  MPE involves two or more resolution authorities applying 
resolution tools to multiple parts of a group, and “is likely to 
result in a break-up of the group into two or more separate 
parts”, along a national, regional, or business-lines basis, 
particularly if a “distressed part of the group” needs to be 
detached. The healthy parts are either sold or become a 
"residual group", while the diseased parts are individually 
bailed in. 
¤  This requires preferred resolution strategies to be articulated for 
each part of the group that may be separately resolved 
¤  The FSB has emphasised that “there is no binary choice 
between the two approaches” and that “in practice, a 
combination might be necessary to accommodate the 
structure of a firm and the local regimes in the key jurisdictions 
where it operates.” 
SUPERVISORY COOPERATION  
UNDER SPE & MPE 
¤  Paul tucker, BoE: Under an SPE approach relatively little co-
operation is required, but the home authority must be sufficiently 
credible to ensure that host authorities "refrain from taking 
independent action", although hosts could provide assistance as 
necessary. 
¤  Under MPE, co-operation becomes more important. Each key host 
authority needs to be open about its plans, and the home 
authority needs to do the same, "ensuring a joined-up, 
collaborative approach with no surprises", (Paul Tucker, BoE, 2013). 
¤  Some supervisors, such as those in the UK and US, have established 
plans to co-operate on resolution, but most are still negotiating.  
¤  However, over recent months there has been a marked 
convergence in how the world's key authorities plan to approach 
resolution 
Some conclusions 
¤  Resolution is closely tied to supervision. Cooperation in the 
supervisory colleges has in some cases been held back by lack of 
agreement on how to handle the resolution of a cross-border 
bank.  
¤  One potential hindrance to reaching ex-ante agreements on 
resolution is the parties’ reluctance to share sensible information, a 
problem which could possibly be overcome by reducing the size 
of the resolution committees.  
¤  The role of the host supervisors must be strengthened. How can a 
host country be expected to participate in a resolution of a bank 
if it has not been given sufficient information of the whole bank 
group and also been given a chance to influence its supervision?  
¤  Aligning the incentives of supervisors and resolution authorities is a 
key objective. In the Eurozone, this in done through a joint 
resolution authority for the big cross- border banks and a joint 
resolution fund.  
¤  Resolution funds may also need to be set up domestically and 
coordinated across borders so as to support common interest 
without unduly compromising fiscal authority.  
Some Conclusions 
¤  Identifying systemic parts of relevant cross–border 
banking groups and confining the efforts to those 
parts may also be a way forward in cross-border 
cooperation. The RRPs may help in this respect.  
¤  If no results in cross-border cooperation are attained, 
the fall-back solution is always to split a bank in 
trouble along country borders.  
¤ BUT 
¤ Such an approach would seriously damage franchise 
value as it happened in the cases of Fortis and to 
some extent Dexia 
